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While there is robust empirical evidence that firm patenting is positively associated with various measures of 
overall performance and competitiveness, less is known about what determines the patenting choice. For this reason, this 
paper examines whether R&D expenditure and the type of knowledge used in the invention determine the decision to patent. 
With this aim, we use a sample of firms and the European Patent Office to analyse how the combination of R&D expenditure 
and  knowledge  codifiability,  observability  and  simplicity  influences  the  patent  decision.  Our  results  contribute  to  the 
literature and assist R&D managers by showing that both R&D and codified knowledge have a positive impact on the 
number of inventions patented by a firm, while observable knowledge has a negative impact on patents. Furthermore, we find 
that  the  effect  of  R&D  expenditure  on  the  propensity  to  patent  inventions  is  negatively  moderated  by  knowledge 
observability and simplicity. 
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HOW DOES KNOWLEDGE MATTER PATENTING INVENTIONS? 
 
1. Introduction 
Past research in strategic management argues that the ability to invent is an important driver 
of firm success (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Nerkar and Shane, 
2007). One aspect closely related to inventions is the patenting decision. However, while prior 
work focuses on patenting performance (Mansfield et al., 1981; Somaya et al., 2007), less is 
known about the factors that lead companies to decide to patent their inventions. Therefore, 
an important question is: what explains differences in the disposition of firms to patent their 
inventions? In this sense, research examines patenting almost exclusively through the lens of 
firm internal R&D (hereafter R&D), which has been shown to have a significant positive 
relationship with patenting (Somaya et al., 2007). However, although R&D is an important 
resource for creating new ideas, the generation of such technological inventions is only one 
aspect of explaining firms’ patenting choices. If not all inventions from R&D departments are 
patented,  there  should  be  other  aspects  (besides  R&D)  that  condition  the  decision  of  a 
company to patent its inventions. Hence, the objective of this paper is to understand why there 
are different patenting propensities among R&D-intensive companies, when there is robust 
empirical  evidence  that  firm  patenting  is  positively  associated  with  various  measures  of 
overall firm performance (see Somaya et al., 2007, for a review). 
This paper proposes that another factor affecting the disposition of a firm to patent its 
inventions is knowledge. That is, we assume that the type of knowledge used by a firm in the 
invention process will condition the number of inventions patented by such a firm (Nerkar 
and  Shane,  2007).  Specifically,  we  propose  that  knowledge  codifiability  will  positively 
influence  patenting  activity,  while  knowledge  observability  and  simplicity  will  negatively  
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influence  the  patenting  choice.  In  other  words,  we  believe  that  companies  will  patent 
inventions  obtained  from  codified,  unobservable  and  complex  knowledge.  There  are  two 
reasons that support this proposition. First, inventions based on codified knowledge are easily 
imitated  (Grant,  1996)  and  thus  companies  will  patent  them  to  guarantee  their  returns. 
Second, unobservable and complex knowledge will lead to real inventions and not to mere 
imitations  (Nonaka,  2007).  That  is,  we  believe  that  only  those  companies  that  obtain 
inventions  based  on  unobservable  and  complex  knowledge  will  have  an  invention  that  is 
patentable, while the output of observable and simple knowledge is always an imitation. 
The exclusive focus in the literature on the relationship between R&D and patenting has 
meant that, to date, questions remain about how other different types of resources, such as 
knowledge, could enhance or harm patenting activity in conjunction with R&D. Answers to 
this  question  can  provide  deeper  theoretical  insights  into  how  and  under  what  conditions 
different combinations of resources as types of knowledge and R&D expenditure determine 
the patenting choice. In this sense, we propose that the positive relationship between R&D 
expenditure  and  the  choice  of  patenting  will  be  moderated  by  the  degree  of  knowledge 
codifiability, observability and simplicity used in the invention process. 
Our study makes two important contributions. First, we extend the innovation literature by 
examining how firms’ strategic choices to deploy and combine different types of knowledge 
with  R&D  expenditure  are  important  predictors  of  firm  patenting  activity.  Second,  we 
contribute to the RBV research by explaining how the appropriate use of resources such as 
knowledge and R&D leads to higher levels of patents and by extension to higher levels of 
competitiveness. That is, based on the RBV, which proposes that deploying different bundles 
or combinations of resources leads to higher levels of value (Penrose, 1959), and on robust 
empirical evidence that confirms that firm patenting is positively associated with performance  
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(Somaya  et  al.,  2007),  we  assume  that  patenting  activity  leads  to  higher  levels  of 
competitiveness. Thus, we propose that through an understanding of the patenting activity, we 
help  both  managers  and  researchers  to  understand  how  to  increase  companies’ 
competitiveness. 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  the  following  section,  we  present  the  theoretical 
background and develop hypotheses relating R&D expenditure, knowledge and the patenting 
choice. Next, we present our method and  empirically test these relationships. Finally,  we 
present the main conclusions, contributions, limitations, and future lines of research that result 
from this paper. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
The RBV suggests that a key determinant of a firm’s competitive advantage is whether or not 
the firm has accumulated the appropriate types of resources (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959). In 
this  paper,  we  build  on  the  RBV  concept  of  VRIO  (valuable,  rare,  inimitable  and  non-
substitutable)  resources  (Barney,  1991)  to  argue  that  firms  will  increase  their  patenting 
propensity  through  the  suitable  use  of  their  R&D  expenditure  and  types  of  knowledge. 
However, before analysing how R&D expenditure and knowledge influence the patenting 
choice of companies, we should start explaining the main features of patents. 
The patent system legally protects innovators against imitators. Therefore, as Blind et al. 
(2006) point out, the traditional motive to patent is the protection of one’s own inventions 
from imitations. That is, it is one of the most common appropriability mechanisms used by 
firms (Teece, 1986; González-Álvarez and Nieto-Antolín, 2007). In this sense, the company 
that owns the patent enjoys a temporary monopoly during which the investment (for example, 
R&D expenditure) can generate returns. However, Levin et al. (1987) point out a range of  
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reasons why, in the majority of industries, patents are not always used as mechanisms to 
protect against imitators. Among others, some reasons that lead companies to avoid patenting 
are: the fact that it is often not easy to demonstrate the novelty of the innovation; the high 
costs involved in obtaining and defending the patent; the fact that imitators can legally copy 
around the patented technology; and the fact that the patent can reveal important information 
on the technology used by the company (González-Álvarez and Nieto-Antolín, 2007). By 
patenting,  the  patent  holder  discloses  information  about  its  inventions  to  competitors. 
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the disclosures of detailed information by the inventor 
against the insurance of a limited monopoly awarded by the state. Next, we explain how the 
R&D expenditure  and the type of knowledge used in the invention process influence the 
decision of companies regarding patenting their inventions. 
 
2.1. R&D as a determinant of patenting choice 
In  examining  which  resources  enhance  patenting,  extant  research  in  management  has 
primarily focused on knowledge accumulated by firms through R&D (Somaya et al., 2007). 
Therefore, R&D is seen as an input into the production of knowledge, which in turn facilitates 
the  identification,  assimilation,  and  exploitation  of  information  generated  both  within  and 
outside the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Many studies argue that invention is the result of idea generation and a problem-solving 
process (Gruber and Marquis, 1969; Utterback, 1971; Rogers, 1983; Nonaka, 1994, 2007). In 
this sense, a key element for idea generation is creativity, defined as the personal ability to 
recognize unusual patterns and relations, and to produce novel ideas (Tang, 1998). Companies 
interested  in  developing  ideas  need  people  involved  in  creative  activities,  that  is,  people 
working  on  R&D.  These  activities  are  considered  the  principal  input  to  the  knowledge  
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creation  process  and  therefore  they  play  a  fundamental  role  in  the  inventing  process. 
Additionally,  we  find  evidence  in  the  literature  that  companies  that  are  most  intensively 
engaged in R&D activities are more innovative (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996; Stock et al., 
2001), and because invention occurs prior to innovation, by extension, these companies will 
develop  a  larger  number  of  inventions.  Furthermore,  there  are  authors  that  consider  that 
patenting can represent an objective measure of the performance of the R&D expenditure 
(Blind  et  al.,  2006;  González-Álvarez  and  Nieto-Antolín,  2007).  Therefore,  although  the 
creation of new ideas may be unanticipated, the literature suggests that firms invest in internal 
R&D  to  increase  their  options  to  generate  ideas  that  can  be  materialized  as  patentable 
inventions (Somaya et al., 2007). Additionally, taking into account the debate about the trade-
off between the disclosures of detailed information by the inventor against the insurance of a 
limited monopoly awarded by the state, we assume that higher levels of R&D expenditure 
will  motivate  companies  to  ensure  the  appropriability  of  the  invention  results  through 
patenting. Thus, we propose our first hypothesis. 
H1:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  R&D  expenditure  and  the  number  of 
inventions patented by a firm. 
 
2.2. Knowledge as a determinant of patenting choice 
Based on the RBV, we know that companies that have VRIO resources will be able to achieve 
and  maintain  sustainable  competitive  advantages  (Barney,  1991).  Of  these  four 
characteristics,  inimitability  is  the  most  important  (Hoopes  et  al.,  2003)  and  is  the  most 
important contribution of the RBV (Barney et al., 2001). It has been assumed that knowledge 
has  the  greatest  ability  of  all  resources  to  serve  as  a  source  of  sustainable  competitive 
advantage (McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002; Nonaka, 2007), in part because when it is well  
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managed it can be a great source of inimitability. In addition, knowledge permits firms to 
predict more accurately the nature and commercial potential of changes in the environment 
and  the  appropriateness  of  strategic  and  tactical  actions  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1990). 
Therefore, among other reasons, companies will manage knowledge to generate inventions 
that are patentable. 
The knowledge necessary to execute organizational routines tends to be tacit in nature 
(Polanyi, 1966; Winter, 1987) because, although the knowledge involved in each of the tasks 
in a specific routine can be explicit, the routines as a whole may be unknown to the majority 
of the participants and, therefore, it will be tacit. Knowledge tacitness has been one of the 
most discussed concepts in the managerial literature on innovation development (Polanyi, 
1966;  Winter,  1987;  Nonaka,  1994;  Zander  and  Kogut,  1995).  Given  the  difficulty  of 
covering all the knowledge tacitness aspects, Subramaniam and Venkatraman (2001), based 
on  Zander  and  Kogut  (1995),  consider  whether  knowledge  tacitness  includes  knowledge 
codifiability, observability and simplicity. These knowledge dimensions create temporal and 
spatial distance, decreasing the likelihood of successful imitation (King, 2007). In relation to 
the extent to which companies manage knowledge to generate inventions that are patentable, 
we  propose  that  while  knowledge  codifiability  will  positively  influence  patenting  choice, 
knowledge observability and simplicity will negatively influence the patenting activities of 
organizations. Arguments supporting this idea are developed next. 
Knowledge codifiability captures the degree to which knowledge can be encoded, even if 
an individual operator does not have the capacity to understand it (Winter, 1987). That is, it 
considers the extent to which the knowledge could be articulated in documents or software 
(Zander and Kogut, 1995).  
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Uncodified  knowledge  is  implicitly  acquired  and  cannot  be  fully  articulated 
(Gopalakrishnan  and  Bierly,  2001).  It  is  related  to  know-how  and  based  on  experience 
(Nonaka,  1994).  It  is  difficult  to  pass  this  kind  of  knowledge  on  to  others  outside  the 
practising community because the terminology and basic principles associated with it are not 
easily  understood.  The  transfer  of  uncodified  knowledge  often  requires  informal 
communication methods and face-to-face contact (Zander and Kogut, 1995), making it very 
difficult  to  obtain  from  another  organization.  Daft  (1983)  examines  whether  one  of  the 
conditions that make a resource impossible to imitate is when it arises from a combination of 
particular  abilities,  knowledge  and  organizational  learning,  and  thus  exhibits  causal 
ambiguity. 
Codified knowledge is easy to transmit and rival companies can thus appropriate this kind 
of knowledge via simple market transaction, unless it is protected by patents (Grant, 1996). 
The  patent  system  is,  therefore,  more  effective  when  protecting  this  type  of  knowledge 
(González-Álvarez  and  Nieto-Antolín,  2007).  In  addition,  codified  knowledge  is  easier  to 
patent  because,  by  definition,  it  is  easily  reducible  to  information  and  therefore  easy  to 
describe.  Because  appropriability  is  expected  to  fall  systematically  as  the  degree  of 
codification  increases,  the  higher  the  degree  of  knowledge  codification,  the  higher  the 
disposition to patent for the firm. Thus, we can propose our second hypothesis. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between knowledge codifiability and the number of 
inventions patented by a firm. 
The second aspect of knowledge in relation to inventions is based on its observability. The 
possibility  that  knowledge  can  be  observed  makes  reference  to  the  degree  to  which  the 
underlying necessary knowledge is revealed by its use (Winter, 1987). That is, knowledge 
observability establishes the degree to which knowledge can be identified without having  
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personal previous experience, and the degree to which it is obvious for a generality of users 
(Subramaniam  and  Venkatraman,  2001).  Unobservable  knowledge  hinders  knowledge 
transfer,  aggregation  and  appropriation.  In  relation  to  inventions,  when  knowledge  is 
unobservable,  companies  will  have  to  develop  their  own  ideas  to  be  able  to  obtain  new 
products. However, if knowledge is observable, all companies will have the same ability to 
launch similar products. Based on the idea that the generation of knowledge together with the 
novelty of the launched product are the dimensions that distinguish innovation from imitation, 
it is reasonable to believe that unobservable knowledge will motivate companies to generate 
ideas internally and give rise to inventions that are patentable. That is, prototypes obtained 
from observable knowledge will never be patentable. The reason is that if we get something 
based on observable knowledge (obvious for a generality of users) there will be nothing to 
patent. Thus: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between knowledge observability and the number of 
inventions patented by a firm. 
The last aspect of knowledge in relation to inventions is based on its complexity. Pringle 
(1951) defines knowledge complexity as the number of parameters needed to define a system. 
It can also be defined in terms of the level of interdependence inherent in the subcomponents 
of  a  piece  of  knowledge  (Winter,  1987;  Zander  and  Kogut,  1995).  Gopalakrishnan  and 
Damanpour  (1994)  define  the  complexity  of  an  innovation  using  three  characteristics: 
difficulty, intellectual sophistication, and originality. Therefore, to develop inventions that are 
patentable, companies need to use some degree of complex (or less simple) knowledge. That 
is,  companies  need  to  base  their  patentable  ideas  on  some  original  and  sophisticated 
knowledge. The reason is that unoriginal knowledge cannot be patented because it is known 
to the rest of the market. These statements lead us to propose our fourth hypothesis.  
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H4:  There  is  a  negative  relationship  between  simplicity  and  the  number  of  inventions 
patented by a firm. 
 
2.3. Combining R&D and knowledge to determine patenting choice 
The previous arguments lead us to assume an interesting effect regarding the interactions 
between the three types of knowledge and R&D. That is, different combinations of types of 
knowledge and R&D expenditure can be analysed to better understand why there are different 
patenting propensities among firms. 
Starting  with  the  first  knowledge  type,  that  is,  knowledge  codifiability,  it  is  easy  to 
understand that if codified knowledge positively influences patenting choice, its combination 
with R&D expenditure will increase the propensity of a firm to patent. That is, companies that 
have invested in R&D will increase their incentive to patent their results if they are based on 
codified knowledge. The reason is that these inventions based on codified knowledge will be 
easy to imitate and companies will want to guarantee the appropriability of the return of the 
inventions through patent protection (Teece, 1986). Thus, our fifth hypothesis follows. 
H5: Knowledge codifiability moderates the relationship between R&D expenditure and the 
number  of  inventions  patented  by  a  firm.  Knowledge  codifiability  increases  the  positive 
relationship that R&D has with the inventions patented by a firm. 
On  the  side  of  knowledge  observability,  given  that  observable  knowledge  cannot  be 
patented, this type of knowledge will reduce the possibilities of patenting the R&D efforts 
made by a company. That is, even when companies invest in R&D, if their results are based 
on observable knowledge, there will be nothing to patent. For that reason, we propose that  
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knowledge observability harms the relationship between R&D expenditure and patents. Thus, 
our sixth hypothesis follows. 
H6: Knowledge observability moderates the relationship between R&D expenditure and 
the number of inventions patented by a firm. Knowledge observability reduces the positive 
relationship that R&D has with the inventions patented by a firm. 
Finally, even if companies are investing a lot of money in their R&D department, when the 
outputs of such R&D efforts are unoriginal ideas or simple knowledge, these outputs will not 
be patentable. Thus, our seventh hypothesis follows. 
H7: Knowledge simplicity moderates the relationship between R&D expenditure and the 
number  of  inventions  patented  by  a  firm.  Knowledge  simplicity  reduces  the  positive 
relationship that R&D has with the inventions patented by a firm. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Sample 
To examine the extent to which firms patent their inventions, we require a sample of firms 
involved in these kinds of activities. We therefore begin with a sample including Spanish 
firms from innovative industries, based on information provided by the National Statistical 
Institute of Spain.
2 We use the SABI database (the most comprehensive database of company 
information in Spain) to identify all companies in these industries. There were a total of 2942 
firms with more than 10 workers in our target sectors. This minimum number of employees 
guarantees the possibility of knowledge sharing and knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994). 
Between  March  and  November  2006,  data  for  the  study’s  independent  and  control 
variables were collected. In January 2008, data for the dependent variable were collected, 
                                                                  
2 The National Statistical Institute (INE) of Spain identifies the five industries with the most “innovative” firms as: NACE 24, Chemical 
companies; NACE 32, Radio, TV, and communications equipment; NACE 33, Medical, precision, and optical instruments; NACE 34, 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi trailers; and NACE 35, Manufacture of other transport equipment.  
  13 
 
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
which reduced the problem of reverse causality encountered in many cross-sectional studies. 
A  time  lag  between  independent  and  dependent  variables  is  also  important  because  the 
patenting effects of knowledge and R&D take time to materialize. 
To collect data for the independent variables, the 2942 firms were contacted by telephone, 
and, shortly thereafter, all firms interviewed were sent an email survey. Because the unit of 
analysis  adopted  in  this  study  was  the  department  where  the  innovation  activity  of  the 
company is carried out, we spoke to the R&D manager. If the firm did not have an R&D 
manager, we instead spoke to the CEO. In total, 2765 firms responded to our phone calls 
(response rate of 94%). During the interview, we first ensured that the firm indeed belongs to 
one  of  the  target  sectors  as  specified  in  the  database  and  that  they  had  more  than  10 
employees. Those firms with less than 10 employees (19), which do not belong to our target 
sectors (539), or which are duplicated or without real activity (443), are excluded from our 
sample. We asked the remaining 1764 firms if we could send them our questionnaire. In total, 
402  firms  responded  to  this  questionnaire  and  of  those,  394  are  considered  valid.  This 
corresponds to a response rate of 22.3% of the firms in our target population. An analysis of 
respondents  and  non-respondents,  via  mean  difference  analysis,  shows  no  significant 
differences in industry membership, number of employees, or revenue. To collect data for the 
dependent variable we used the European Patent Office database, which contains more than 
60 million patent documents from around the world. 
 
3.2. Variable measures 
We take several steps to ensure data validity  and reliability for the measures used in the 
questionnaire. First, we pre-tested all measures in 25 interviews with R&D managers and 
asked them to closely review the survey to ensure the clarity of the questions, and to ascertain  
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whether  the  scales  captured  the  desired  information.  We  then  revised  any  potentially 
confusing items before submitting the questionnaire. 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is the number of inventions patented by the firm. 
It is measured by the number of patents subscribed by each firm on the European Patent 
Office database. This number ranges from 0 to 455. However, after conducting an outliers 
analysis, we eliminate eight firms. For the 394 valid firms, the number of patents subscribed 
by companies ranges from 0 to 54. We then convert this number into a seven-point Likert 
scale (the same used in the questionnaire). This measure has been validated by a question 
from  the  questionnaire  in  which  we  ask  each  firm  if  they  patented  their  inventions.  The 
correlation  between  these  two  measures  is  0.707  (p  <  0.01),  suggesting  large  convergent 
validity (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). 
Independent variables. Internal R&D expenditure is measured as an average percentage of 
the  sales  turnover  of  the  company  for  the  past  five  years.  We  measure  knowledge 
codifiability, observability and simplicity using the Subramaniam and Venkatraman (2001) 
scale. The questions appear in a seven-point scale consisting of six items. The first three items 
measure  knowledge  codifiability  (α  =  0.91);  the  next  two  items  measure  knowledge 
observability  (α  =  0.68)  and  the  last  item  measures  knowledge  simplicity.  It  has  to  be 
mentioned that while the original authors found a unidimensional construct that they called 
“tacit  knowledge”,  we  find  three  independent  dimensions.  This  result  could  be  seen  as  a 
limitation in that we do not find the same result as the authors of the scale; however, it is also 
a contribution if we take into account that we are able to relate each of the dimensions with 
patenting choice. 
Control variables. We control for organizational size, age, external R&D expenditure, the 
radicalness of the inventions developed and the company’s industry. The size, age, R&D  
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expenditure and the radicalness data are obtained from the questionnaire, while we take the 
industry data from the SABI database. The size variable is measured in terms of the number 
of employees. Because of its dispersion, the variable is log transformed. Industry effects are 
captured by dummy variables for the firms’ main sector as indicated by their industry code 
(NACE code) taken from the sample frame. Dummy variables were created for industries 24, 
32,  33,  34  and  35.  We  divided  industry  24  into  pharmaceutical  and  non-pharmaceutical 
because  of  the  large  differences  that  we  found  between  them.  We  measured  inventions’ 
radicalness based on the Subramanian and Youndt (2005) scale. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 provides means, standard deviations and correlations for all quantitative variables. 
Skewness  and  kurtosis  statistics  fall  well  within  the  boundaries  for  normality,  allowing 
parametric  tests  of  significance.  To  ensure  that  multicollinearity  was  not  an  issue,  value 
inflation factors were computed (not reported because of space limitations). None of them 
exceeded 2, indicating no multicollinearity. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
The hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression analysis because an interaction 
effect only exists if the interaction term gives a significant contribution over and above the 
direct  effects  of  the  independent  variable  (Wiklund  and  Shepherd,  2003).  The  results  are 
displayed in Table 2. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here  
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------------------------------------------ 
The base model (control variables only) explains a statistically significant share of the 
variance in patenting choice (adjusted R² = 0.14, p < 0.001). Taking into account the effects of 
each control variable, firm size and age positively influence patenting choice. Furthermore, 
consistent with the literature (Mansfield et al., 1981) pertaining to the pharmaceutical and the 
radio, TV and communication equipment industries, patenting choice is positively related to 
higher levels of patenting activity. The main effects model makes a significant contribution 
over and above the base model (٨R² = 0.06, p < 0.001). The positive and significant effects of 
internal  R&D  expenditure  and  knowledge  codifiability  on  patenting  choice  support 
hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. Hypothesis 3 is supported by the negative and significant 
effect  of  knowledge  observability  on  patenting  choice.  However,  hypothesis  4  is  not 
supported. 
The interaction terms make different contributions. The second interaction term, which 
relates R&D with knowledge observability, makes a significant contribution over and above 
the main effects (٨R² = 0.01, p < 0.1) and supports hypothesis 6. To determine the nature of 
this interaction, we plot the effect of knowledge observability against the dependent variable 
for values of R&D set at the mean and one standard deviation above and below the mean, as 
suggested by Cohen and Cohen (1983). The plot indicates that for high levels of knowledge 
observability,  the  relationship  between  internal  R&D  expenditure  and  patenting  choice  is 
almost constant. However, when knowledge is unobservable, companies will tend to patent 
while their internal R&D expenditure increases (see Figure 1a). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1a about here 
------------------------------------------  
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The third interaction, which relates R&D with knowledge simplicity, makes a significant 
contribution over and above the main effects (٨R² = 0.02, p < 0.05) and gives support to 
hypothesis 7. To determine the nature of this interaction, we plot the effect of knowledge 
simplicity on the dependent variable for values of R&D set at the mean and one standard 
deviation above and below the mean, as suggested by Cohen and Cohen (1983). The plot 
indicates that firms tend to patent a little less when internal R&D expenditure increases and 
knowledge is very simple. On the contrary, we find that companies increase their patenting 
activity if knowledge is complex and their R&D expenditure increases (see Figure 1b). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1b about here 
------------------------------------------ 
The insignificant effect of the interaction between R&D and knowledge simplicity does not 




“In  an  economy  where  the  only  certainty  is  uncertainty,  the  one  sure  source  of  lasting 
competitive  advantage  is  knowledge”  (Nonaka,  2007,  p.  162).  In  this  sense,  this  paper 
explains  that  companies  may  face  such  uncertainties  by  patenting  inventions  through  the 
appropriate use of their resources, knowledge and money (internal R&D expenditure). 
There is a consensus in the literature confirming that internal R&D expenditure positively 
influences patents and that patents are a good driver of higher levels of performance (Somaya 
et al., 2007). Based on the characteristics of VRIO resources (Barney, 1991), on previous  
  18 
 
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
literature and on general intuition, we have taken for granted that patenting leads to higher 
levels of performance. On the contrary, given that not all R&D-intensive companies patent 
their inventions, we have looked for an explanation of the causes that could make companies 
increase or reduce their patenting decisions. Among the large number of reasons given in the 
literature for enhancing and harming patenting (González-Álvarez and Nieto-Antolín, 2007), 
we have focused our analysis on the combination of internal R&D expenditure and types of 
knowledge. 
Having  found  that  internal  R&D  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  number  of  inventions 
patented by a firm is important because it helps both researchers and practitioners confirm 
that investing money in R&D has the benefit of obtaining a higher number of inventions to 
patent, and by extension, higher levels of performance and value (Nerkar and Shane, 2007; 
Somaya et al., 2007). It is also interesting to point out that external R&D expenditure does not 
impact  on  patenting  propensity.  This  is  because  external  R&D  is  used  more  to  obtain 
imitations than innovations (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996). 
However,  our  findings  about  the  relationship  between  the  types  of  knowledge  and 
patenting  choice  lead  us  to  a  very  interesting  point.  In  general,  we  have  proposed  that 
inventions  that  are  patentable  should  be  based  on  codified,  unobservable  and  complex 
knowledge. Taking into account the positive relation found between codified knowledge and 
patenting, we can conclude that, consistent with the literature, imitable knowledge will be 
patented while non-imitable knowledge (uncodified) will be the base for causal ambiguity and 
then, companies will have no need to patent (Mansfield et al., 1981; Daft, 1983; Reed and 
DeFillippi, 1990; Barney, 1991; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Furthermore, this finding confirms 
that a good way of guaranteeing the appropriability of the returns of inventions based on 
codified knowledge is by patenting them (González-Álvarez and Nieto-Antolín, 2007). The  
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negative relationship between observable knowledge and patenting is unsurprising when we 
consider that observable or known knowledge cannot be patented (there is nothing new to 
protect). Taking these two findings as a whole, we can conclude that companies patent those 
new  ideas  (based  on  unobservable  knowledge)  that  can  be  imitated  (based  on  codified 
knowledge).  This  is  interesting  because  it  helps  us  understand  why  knowledge  must  be 
thoroughly  analysed.  That  is,  knowledge  must  be  separated  into  its  various  types  to  be 
understandable. This idea of separating types of knowledge makes an interesting contribution 
beyond  Subramanian  and  Venkatraman’s  (2001)  finding.  That  is,  while  they  analysed 
knowledge  tacitness  as  a  unique  construct  that  did  not  permit  the  analysis  of  each  of  its 
dimensions  independently,  we  have  been  able  to  find  out  that  one  of  the  dimensions  of 
knowledge tacitness (codifiability) positively influences patenting choice, while the other two 
are negatively related to our dependent variable. 
Finally, we find interesting the negative moderator role of both knowledge observability 
and simplicity and R&D on the propensity to patent inventions. That is, we found that for 
high levels of knowledge observability and simplicity, the relationship between internal R&D 
expenditure  and  the  patenting  choice  is  highly  stable.  Even  more,  when  combining  very 
simple knowledge with R&D expenditure, companies tend to patent less. Maybe, because 
given the simplicity of such knowledge, companies do not want to disclose the knowledge 
used to their competitors. These findings suggest that companies cannot protect any R&D 
effort if the output is observable and simple knowledge. The reason is that, as we have already 
explained,  simple  and  unoriginal  knowledge  does  not  give  rise  to  inventions  that  are 
patentable. However, when knowledge is unobservable (new for other competitors) and/or 
complex, companies will tend to patent while their internal R&D expenditure increases. That 
is, companies tend to patent their original and  complex ideas obtained by  investments in  
  20 
 
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
R&D. This is because, once those companies have something to patent (an original and new 
idea), they want to secure the appropriability of the returns of their investments on R&D. 
This  study  has  certain  limitations  that  future  research  should  aim  to  overcome.  First, 
because our intention was to look at the proclivity to patent inventions, we focused on five 
industries  traditionally  involved  in  innovative  activity.  While  we  believe  that  this  is  an 
appropriate  approach  given  our  research  interest,  care  must  be  taken  in  generalizing  our 
findings to other industries. In addition, our data were collected from Spanish firms only, 
which limits their generalizability to other cultural contexts. Second, we used the industry as a 
control variable, obtaining similar findings to those of other studies (Mansfield et al., 1981). 
That is, we found that traditional patenting industries such as pharmaceuticals or medical, 
precision, and optical instruments do influence the patenting propensity of firms. However, 
other contextual factors such as dynamism should be taken into account in future research. 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations for quantitative variables 
Variables  Mean  S.D.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
1. Patents  2.13  1.75    1                       
2. Codifiability  4.59  1.34    0.07    1                     
3. Observability  3.63  1.35  –0.15(**)    0.40(**)    1                   
4. Simplicity  3.70  1.66  –0.13(**)    0.33(**)    0.44(**)    1                 
5. Internal R&D   9.77  14.48    0.11(*)  –0.01  –0.11(*)  –0.136(**)    1               
6. External R&D  2.52  6.89    0.01  –0.03    0.016  –0.001    0.285(**)    1             
7. Firm Size  32.09  23.44    0.18(**)  –0.01  –0.03    0.017  –0.074  –0.053    1           
8. Firm Age  3.98  1.35    0.36(**)  –0.03  –0.12(*)  –0.024  –0.150(**)  –0.063    0.33(**)    1         
9. Industry 244   0.07  0.25    0.15(**)  –0.01  –0.01  –0.019    0.082    0.185(**)    0.01    0.15(**)    1       
10. Industry 32  0.13  0.33    0.06  –0.03  –0.07  –0.050    0.160(**)    0.023  –0.16(**)  –0.06  –0.10(*)    1     
11. Industry 33  0.10  0.30  –0.02  –0.08  –0.03  –0.047    0.117(*)    0.041  –0.11(*)  –0.13(**)  –0.09  –0.13(*)    1   
12. Industry 34  0.20  0.40    0.03    0.01    0.08    0.075  –0.131(**)  –0.061  –0.00    0.19(**)  –0.13(**)  –0.19(**)  –0.17(**)    1 
13. Industry 35  0.13  0.34  –0.04  –0.02    0.07  –0.039  –0.060  –0.027    0.05  –0.05  –0.10(*)  –0.15(**)  –0.13(*)  –0.19(**) 
+ p < .10   * p < .05    **p < .01   *** < .001 (n = 394) 
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Table 2. Independent and contingency models of R&D, knowledge and patents 
Base model  Independent model  Contingent model 1  Contingent model 2  Contingent model 3 
Dependent 
variables  Coefficient  t-
statistic  Coefficient  t-
statistic  Coefficient  t-
statistic  Coefficient  t-




                             
Firm size   0.42***   6.32                 
Firm age   0.01+   1.94                 
External R&D    0.01   0.25                 
Industry 244ª   0.89*   2.48                 
Industry 32ª   0.66*   2.43                 
Industry 33ª   0.44   1.48                 
Industry 34ª   0.12   0.53                 
Industry 35ª   0.07   0.26                 
Radicalness  –0.05  –0.80                 
Main effect variables: Internal R&D expenditure and types of knowledge   
Internal R&D        0.02*   2.48             
Codifiability       0.25***   3.59             
Observability      –0.18*  –2.24             
Simplicity      –0.09  –1.63             
Interactions: Internal R&D × × × × types of knowledge   
Codifiability × 
R&D  
            –0.01  –1.43         
Observability 
× R&D 
                –0.01+  –1.76     
Complexity  × 
R&D 
                    –0.01*  –2.47 
Model                               
R
2  0.16    0.22    0.23    0.23    0.24   
Adjusted R
2  0.14***    0.19***    0.20***    0.20***    0.21***   
F-statistic    8.31    8.26    7.84    7.932    8.21 
Change in R
2      0.06***    0.01    0.01+    0.02*   
Change in F           6.97     2.06     3.099     6.11 
Standardized regression coefficients are displayed in the table. 
ªDummy for industries;  + p < .10   * p < .05    **p < .01   *** < .001 (n = 394) 
 
 
 